"Giấc mộng Trung Hoa" và "ngoại giao thô cằn"
Một trong những đặc điểm nổi bật của giới quan chức Trung Quốc tại các cuộc hội thảo quốc tế là: Ngôn ngữ mà họ sử dụng thường khá cục cằn, không giúp ích gì cho các nỗ lực của Bắc Kinh muốn được công nhận là một thành viên của cộng đồng ngoại giao quốc tế.
Sự lịch thiệp và tôn trọng đối tác là điều họ thiếu hẳn ở các diễn đàn quốc tế. Điều này có thể đẩy Trung Quốc đến chỗ bị dư luận xem thường, chỉ trích. Fang Fang Kecheng, một blogger người Trung Quốc vài năm trước đã bỏ công sưu tầm số lần mà phát ngôn viên Bộ Ngoại giao nước này sử dụng cụm từ “làm tổn hại tới Trung Quốc”. Theo đó, đã có tới 140 lần phát biểu như vậy, nhằm vào 42 nước và tổ chức quốc tế.
Ông Dương Khiết Trì với câu nói "tai tiếng": “Trung Quốc là nước lớn, các nước khác là nước nhỏ, và đó là thực tế”.
Trung Quốc đặc biệt sử dụng thứ ngôn ngữ cứng rắn với các nước láng giềng. Tháng 12/2013, ông Vương Nghị đã buông ra một tràng chỉ trích nhằm vào Australia trong cuộc gặp mặt đối mặt với đồng cấp nước này, bà Julie Bishop. Một quan chức ngoại giao cấp cao của Australia nói rằng, đây là hành động ngoại giao “thô lỗ” nhất mà ông từng gặp suốt 30 năm trong nghề.
Tháng 7/2011, Philippines quyết định cấm cửa, đuổi ra ngoài phòng họp đối với một quan chức ngoại giao cấp cao của Bắc Kinh do lối hành xử lỗ mãng, không xứng với “một nhà ngoại giao”. Trước đó, tại Diễn đàn Khu vực ASEAN (ARF) tại Hà Nội hồi năm 2010, Ngoại trưởng Trung Quốc lúc đó là ông Dương Khiết Trì đã tuyên bố đầy giận dữ rằng: “Trung Quốc là nước lớn, các nước khác là nước nhỏ, và đó là thực tế”.
Lối hành xử kiểu thô lỗ như vậy ngày một phổ biến khi các đại diện Trung Quốc tham dự các diễn đàn ngoại giao và chính trị quốc tế. Tại Đối thoại Shangri La vừa qua ở Singapore, tướng Vương Quán Trung, Phó Tổng tham mưu trưởng quân đội Trung Quốc, có những chỉ trích cộc cằn nhằm vào Thủ tướng Nhật Shinzo Abe và Bộ trưởng quốc phòng Mỹ Chuck Hagel. Bỏ bài phát biểu đã chuẩn bị từ trước, tướng Vương dành tới hơn 10 phút lên án Mỹ-Nhật và cho rằng “ông Abe và ông Hagel có sự chỉ trích một cách không tưởng tượng được với Trung Quốc”.
Trên thực tế, cách hành xử ngoại giao kiểu sỗ sàng như vậy không phải là hoàn toàn mới. Dữ liệu, tư liệu từ hồi thế kỉ 15 cho thấy: Các vương triều Trung Quốc sử dụng thứ ngôn ngữ kiểu này như là công cụ để đe dọa các nước láng giềng mà họ coi là dân “man di”; các phong thư ngoại giao thường được soạn theo lối cụt lủn, không hề tôn trọng nước đối tác. Một trong những cụm từ yêu thích được các Hoàng đế Trung Hoa sử dụng là “Trung Hoa là một nước lớn” – một thói quen vẫn còn tồn tại đến ngày nay. Ngôn ngữ và văn hóa có tính truyền đời, có lẽ vậy mà người ta mới được nghe tới khái niệm “Trung Quốc là nước lớn” được giới quan chức Trung Quốc (như ông Dương Khiết Trì) đưa ra tại các cuộc hội thảo quốc tế.
Trong một thế giới lý tưởng, mọi người ai cũng mong đợi các nhà ngoại giao sử dụng ngôn từ lịch thiệp, tôn trọng người khác. Thế nhưng, ý tưởng đó dường như là điều xa xỉ đối với nhiều quan chức Trung Quốc. Cùng lúc, có nhiều phàn nàn rằng du khách Trung Quốc thường thực hiện các hành vi “không văn minh” khi du lịch nước ngoài. Những biểu hiện như vậy chỉ làm hỏng hình ảnh dân tộc, uy tín quốc gia.
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China’s ‘New’ Language of Diplomacy
From : Tuan V. Nguyen
A notable characteristic of Chinese officials in international conferences and media is that their language is unusually blunt and rude in a manner that has done nothing to aid China’s effort to be recognized as a civilized member of the world diplomatic community.
Among Chinese officials and diplomats, politeness and respect seem absent from their discourse in international forums. After a recent visit to Vietnam, Yang Jiechi, a state councilor with a foreign policy portfolio, declared in the Chinese media that his objective was to lecture his Vietnamese counterparts.
A certain section of the Chinese media even called Vietnam a “prodigal son.” The comments were made amid a dangerous standoff between China and Vietnam in the disputed Paracel Islands. The language is patronizing and impudent. Indeed, to many Vietnamese, the reference of “prodigal son” is not only offensive, but can also be likened to an ideology of colonialism.
What’s interesting is that for a country aiming for superpower status, when the shoe is on the other foot, the Chinese dragon can be remarkably vulnerable to slights. Fang Kecheng, a Chinese blogger and master’s degree candidate in journalism at Peking University, a couple of years ago counted up the times foreign ministry spokesmen said officially that Chinese’s “feelings had been hurt.” According to Fang’s analysis, Chinese’s feelings were hurt at least 140 times by at least 42 countries as obscure as Iceland and Guatemala as well as a bunch of organizations since the Communists threw out the Kuomintang in 1949..
Typically, a statement goes like this” "The (incident/statement) grossly interfered in China's internal affairs, gravely hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and damaged the political basis of China-(offending country) bilateral relations."
Victor Mair, a linguist writing in The Language Log at the University of Pennsylvania in the US, decided to check how often the phrase “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people” occurs in Google. The Chinese, Mair reported, had their feelings hurt 17,000 times by 2011. The country with the next most hurt feelings was Japan, with 178. Third was the United States, with five. Both actors Brad Pitt and his wife, Angelina Jolie, hurt Chinese feelings at different times, Pitt by appearing in a movie about Tibet and Jolie by inadvertently referring to director Ang Lee, a Taiwanese, as Chinese.
By contrast, China has used stiff language on a long string of countries besides Vietnam, none of which reported “hurt feelings.”
In December last year, for instance, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a vicious criticism of Australia during a televised face-to-face meeting with the Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. A senior Australian diplomat described the incident as the rudest speech he has seen in his 30-year career as a diplomat.
In July 2011, Philippine officials decided to ban a senior Chinese diplomat from meetings because of his rude behavior.A memorandum from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said that the Chinese diplomat exhibited “conduct unbecoming of a diplomat.”
In her recent memoir, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed that in the 2010 Asean Regional Forum in Hanoi the then-Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi lost his composure and launched into a 30-minute monologue, after Asean ministers complained that China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea had triggered anxieties among ASEAN countries.
At one point Yang declared that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact” – a point that was totally irrelevant to the discussion.
That kind of rude behavior from Chinese officials is now increasingly prevalent in international political and diplomatic forums. Early this month, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the world witnessed an ill-mannered outburst from a Chinese general in response to comments from US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Japanese Prime Minister Shinto Abe.
Hagel listed a number of serious frictions in the South China Sea and warned China against "destabilizing actions." Abe talked about China's aggressive moves in the South and East China seas, and urged countries to respect the rule of law. In response, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army said that the remarks by Hagel and Abe were “simply unimaginable.” It seems clear that the general was not comfortable with facts.
In fact, rude language in China’s diplomacy is not new at all. Documents retrieved as early as the 15th Century show that Chinese emperors used such language to threaten neighboring countries that they considered barbarians. Their writing style was short and to the point, and their words utterly disrespectful.
One of Chinese emperors’ favorite usage was “China is a big country,” a construction that obviously survives today. Language and culture are transmissive. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising to see the reference to “big country” by Chinese officials.
In an ideal world, one would expect diplomats to use polite and respectful words, not patronizing expressions, to make the world better. However, that ideal seems to be a luxury for many Chinese officials. It has recently been noted that Chinese tourists exhibited "uncivilized behaviors" when they traveled overseas, and their behaviors harm the country’s image. In a similar way, those ill-mannered words – no matter what the circumstances – uttered by Chinese officials in international forums can only harm the country’s prestige and do nothing to advance their argument.
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New reality for Vietnam-China relations
From : Huong Le Thu
The deployment of China’s HD 981 oil drilling rig is undoubtedly the most serious incident in Sino- Vietnamese relations since the normalization of ties in 1991.
What was considered a positive relationship based on 16 “golden words” in Chinese translated into long-term, stable, future-oriented, comprehensive cooperation relations and four “goods” – good neighbors, good friends, good comrades and good partners – is being seriously challenged.
Until May and the arrival of the drillship, Vietnam boasted of its diplomatic accomplishments. Successful multilateral diplomacy had resulted in a strong reputation as an active member of regional and trans-regional forums. The expanded network of bilateral ties, including partnership systems (comprehensive, strategic and strategic cooperative) with 15 countries around the world gave Hanoi the false assurance of international support.
Given that the constraints on Vietnam’s defense strategy follow the principle of three non-alignments – no military alliances, no foreign bases on Vietnamese soil and no intervention from a third country – preventive diplomacy has taken the role of building a security net.
But as the oil rig crisis has proved, the cooperative strategic partnership, supposedly based on a long-term stable relationship with China and Russia, is merely a guarantee of peaceful existence. Not only it did not prevent China from an aggressive move towards Vietnam, but it failed to pressure Russia for support. Instead, in the wake of the Vietnam-China crisis, Moscow signed a lucrative gas contract with Beijing.
Such disregard for Vietnamese sovereignty means that Beijing attaches little value to the contest
Friends in need?
Not all of Vietnam’s diplomatic efforts have been in vain. Consistency in promoting non-confrontation, respect for international law and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes has given Hanoi a credible image as a responsible member of the international community. Such an attitude is supported by regional actors.
Asean time and time again has called for restraint in the name of regional stability. Vietnam has been an active promoter of Asean’s role in the region and centrality. However, Asean is caught between fealty to its non-interference principles and staying relevant in the region, so the furthest it went was to issue a separate statement, expressing “strong concern” over the events in the South China Sea.
There are a number of reasons why most Asean member states prefer to remain neutral – for example the economic rationale in the relationship with China, not so unlike the considerations of some in the Vietnamese Communist Party who have remained silent. But Asean has shown that it is capable of speaking with one stronger voice, in the wake of extra-ordinary events threatening regional peace, which keep Hanoi hopeful that the treaty organization would have some clout.
The crisis is no longer a bilateral issue between Vietnam and China as its implications affect the peace of the entire region. It is now two Asean member states that are suffering the same instability from China – Vietnam and the Philippines – with Indonesia also waking up to intrusions into its Natuna area, which is rich in minerals to be extracted.
Recalling the association’s origins – the common threat that brought the region together – and the need to sustain its centrality, it is in Asean’s best interest not to buckle.
However difficult the disturbance of the status quo in the South China Sea, crisis can be a catalyst for change. Both Tokyo and Washington are keen to develop defense cooperation talks with Hanoi.
For Japan, Vietnam is an important player in its intention to revise collective self-defense. Given that Japan has been consistently one of the top foreign investors and the biggest donor in Vietnam, the trust between the countries is strong. The US has recognized Vietnam’s strategic importance, particularly for its rebalancing strategy. Hanoi and Washington have been gradually tightening cooperation, as seen from high-level visits in 2013, which resulted in the
signing of a comprehensive partnership, although not a strategic one as initially expected.
One of the reasons that Hanoi has been cautious in getting too close with Washington was fear of agitating China. But given the current events, this fear also needs revision. Other sensitive issues involving the domestic politics of Vietnam as the obstacle for closer Washington-Hanoi cooperation will take longer to revise. Another possible ally comes from the Asean region - the Philippines welcomed Vietnam on its side at the the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea.
Prime Minister Abe’s keynote speech and US Defense Minister Chuck Hagel’s address at the 2014 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore took the bilateral dispute between Hanoi and Beijing to a global level. While having such diplomatic support from two crucial actors in the region, Vietnam still seems to be undecided how to leverage that.
The speech of the Vietnamese Defense Minister was confusing in a way, as it requested that China remove the oil rig, but also emphasized the “good” relationship with the northern neighbor. This contradictory message signifies that internally the Vietnamese leadership has not reached consensus.
On the eve of the Shangri-la Dialogue, the Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung conveyed through international media a determination to bring the case to the law of the sea tribunal.. But the “readiness” announced has yet to receive public backing from the President and CPV Secretary General. Until then, Vietnam is facing growing societal discontent, threat of a leadership crisis and the possibility of waning international support.
It’s time to get over the disillusion with failed comradeship and come up with a new strategic outlook and an efficient and transparent crisis management strategy. Hesitation will deter international support. Given the bad experience in over-relying on one partner, Vietnam is should be extra-vigilant in going into any dependency.
Pursuing a legal solution may be the best possibility that Hanoi has. It would reconfirm Vietnamese commitment to the peaceful resolution of the disputes, affirm Vietnam as a responsible member of international community, avoid an internal leadership crisis and bring the long-term dispute to an end. From China’s side, a revision of the good neighbor policy is also yet to be announced. It is increasingly unlikely that it will be – except downward
From : Asia Sentinel ( Hoai Thanh ),...............
http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/china-new-language-diplomacy/
http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/new-reality-vietnam-china-relations/